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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Contracting relationships vary both in the extent to which they are complete and 
involve formal contract specification as well as the extent to which they are based on 
strong relationships and rely on cooperation and trust. Where a contracting arrangement 
falls on these two continuums constitutes what this paper refers to as “relationship design” 
and is likely to impact contractor performance. We use data from a survey of child care 
centers and Head Start agencies in Ohio to examine the association between the design of 
contracting relationships and contractor performance. Contractor performance is assessed 
in two ways: an objective measure of violations identified by government inspectors and 
a perceptual self-rated measure of performance reported by the contracted service 
providers. Measures of relationship design are constructed using multiple survey items 
and are included in multivariate regression analyses while controlling for a variety of 
organizational characteristics. Findings suggest that contracts involving stronger 
relationships are positively associated with child care center performance and more 
complete contracts are negatively associated with performance, when performance is 
measured using contractor self-reports.   
 
Key words: contractor performance, relationship design, complete contract, relational 
contract 
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INTRODUCTION 
Representing a departure from the hierarchical decision-making process, 
collaborative governance has recently gained renewed attention from public management 
scholars. It involves some degree of trust in partners’ competencies and presumes 
participation of many actors in the decision-making and implementation processes. While 
being examined in a variety of settings, collaborative activities are of particular interest in 
the context of privatization which almost always involves short or long-term inter-
organizational links and relationships.   
A key challenge for public managers implementing government contracts involves 
determining which characteristics of contracts can enhance or hinder the contractors’ 
performance. Based on empirical findings suggesting collaborative relationships are 
prevalent in many government contracts (Beinecke and DeFillippi 1999; DeHoog 1990; 
Johnston and Romzek 2008; Lambright 2009; Romzek and Johnston 2005; Smith 1996: 
Van Slyke 2007), some scholars believe such modes of contract implementation represent 
a distinct type of contracts commonly referred to as relational. In relational contracts, 
trust and cooperation are essential, and parties recognize that they have an interdependent 
relationship (Sclar 2000). Relational contracts involve open-ended, long-term exchanges 
(Allen 2002; Beinecke and DeFillippi 1999; MacNeil 1974; Smith 2005) and are used in 
situations with a high level of asset specificity and uncertainty (Sclar 2000). Principals 
and agents work together to develop and implement relational contracts (DeHoog 1990; 
Brown et al. 2006), and the terms of the agreement evolve throughout the contracting 
process (Artz and Brush 2000; Campbell and Harris 1993; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). 
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This provides parties with great flexibility to respond to changing conditions (Levin 
2003).   
While there has been a growing scholarly interest in relational contracting, little is 
known about the situations in which relational contracting will be more or less effective 
than traditional contracting (Brown et al. 2006). To address this gap, this study explores 
the association between the design of contracting relationships and contractor 
performance. The contributions that this research makes to the contract management 
literature are empirical. We develop several measures that operationalize existing 
concepts within the relational contracting literature by employing data on a variety of 
specific practices used by public managers in the course of contract implementation. 
Examples of these measures include shared goals and procedures, the involvement of 
contractors in different aspects of decision-making, and the utilization of practices based 
on mutual respect and openness. In addition, this research provides important insights 
into the role of relationship design in contract implementation in the context of social 
services with its focus on child care. This is a field where contract performance is 
difficult to measure and quantify, where long-term relationships are prevalent and private 
markets are thin, and where close and informal relationships are particularly important 
(Johnston and Romzek 2008; Lambright 2009; Smith 1996; Smith and Smyth 1996; Van 
Slyke 2007).  
This paper begins by providing an overview of complete, incomplete, and 
relational contracting and by developing hypotheses about the association between 
relationship design and contractor performance. Due to the fact that the body of public 
administration literature focusing on relational contracting is still relatively limited, this 
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study uses cross-disciplinary research from the fields of economics, sociology, law, and 
public health. Following this, our methodology and findings are detailed. We conclude by 
exploring the implications of our findings on the association between relationship design 
and contractor performance and by highlighting areas for further research. 
COMPLETE, INCOMPLETE AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 
Scholars have typically described contracts as either being complete, incomplete, 
or relational. These contracting arrangements are not mutually exclusive: contracts can 
vary in both the extent to which they are complete and the extent to which they are 
relational. This section reviews existing theoretical and empirical research on complete, 
incomplete, and relational contracts, recognizing the ambiguous distinctions between 
these terms.    
 All types of exchanges, including government contracts, involve transaction costs 
(Williamson 1975, 1981, 1985). Transaction costs incurred prior to service 
implementation, referred to as ex ante transaction costs, are associated with finding an 
appropriate partner as well as negotiating and writing the contract. The ex post 
transaction costs, incurred in the implementation stage, include dispute resolution as well 
as monitoring, enforcing, and renegotiating the contract. The point at which transaction 
costs are incurred by the involved parties in the contracting process has been used in the 
literature to identify two types of contracts: complete and incomplete.   
In complete contracts, transaction costs are primarily incurred at the outset of the 
exchange. With this type of contracting, parties must be able to foresee all possible 
contingencies, agree to responses to all these contingencies, and be willing to abide by 
the terms of the contract (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). True “complete” contracts are 
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considered impossible in practice because of the cognitive limits of individuals (Brown et 
al. 2006; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Tirole 1999).   
The extent of “incompleteness” in real-world contracts varies (Williamson 1985):  
some contracts are very complex and specify a variety of future contingencies and 
responses to these contingencies in advance while others are more open-ended and rely 
on parties to develop responses to contingencies as they arise. Transaction costs 
associated with these activities are incurred both prior to and during the implementation 
of the contract. The managerial tradeoffs between the ex ante and the ex post transaction 
costs may be determined by the level of uncertainty associated with contract 
implementation. It may be possible to lessen the cost of making the contract by avoiding 
the specification of all future contingencies, resulting in an incomplete contract and 
increasing the likelihood of renegotiation in the future to deal with unspecified 
contingencies (Allen et al. 2002).  
Incomplete contracts are vulnerable to opportunism, defined by Williamson as “a 
lack of candor or honesty in transaction, to include self-interest with guile” (1975, 9) 
because they create opportunities for adverse selection and moral hazard (Sclar 2000). In 
the contracting literature, the party performing the task is referred to as the agent, and the 
party delegating the task is referred to as the principal. Adverse selection, or “hidden 
information” as Arrow (1984) describes it, happens when an agent misrepresents their 
ability to fulfill their contractual responsibilities (Eisenhardt 1989; Van Slyke 2007). 
With moral hazard, or “hidden action,” it is difficult for the principal to observe and 
evaluate all of the agent’s actions (Arrow 1984). Agents can exploit this informational 
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asymmetry and fail to fulfill their contractual responsibilities, creating a moral hazard 
problem (Eisenhardt 1989; Sclar 2000; Van Slyke 2007). 
One strategy for addressing the problems created by incomplete contracts is to 
modify the agreement to more closely resemble a complete contract (Sclar 2000). 
However as Granovetter (1985) highlights, relying solely on contracts in the absence of 
trust will simply result in individuals trying to invent creative ways to circumvent 
institutional constraints. Another strategy is to capitalize on the trust and the mutual 
understanding between the involved parties and to develop a relational contract. While 
being ambiguous and lacking a universally accepted definition (Van Slyke 2006), 
relational contracting generally refers to contracts based on long-term relationships that 
involve trust and cooperation and are less vulnerable to opportunism (Allen 2002; Allen 
et al. 2002; Bennett and Ferlie 1999; DeHoog 1990; Brown et al. 2006; Sclar 2000). 
Empirical evidence suggests that relational contracts have been used in a wide variety of 
public policy settings including infectious disease management (Allen et al. 2002), 
Medicaid managed care (Beinecke and DeFillipi 1999), HIV/AIDS services (Bennett and 
Ferlie 1996), foster care services (Klingner et al. 2002), social services (Romzek and 
Johnston 2005; Smith 1996; Van Slyke 2006), and human waste collection (Kim 2005).  
Being by definition incomplete, relational contracts do not determine all terms of 
the agreement in advance of its execution (Artz and Brush 2000; Campbell and Harris 
1993; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Instead, they provide parties with the flexibility to 
respond appropriately to the different contingencies that may arise (Campbell and Harris 
1993; DeHoog 1990, Levin 2003; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). In relational contracting, 
principals and agents jointly develop and implement contracts (DeHoog 1990; Brown et 
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al. 2006) and maintain strong ties perceived to be in the best long-term interests of both 
the principal and agent. As described by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002), relational 
contracts are “sustained by the value of future relations (p. 39).” Each party is expected to 
make the necessary accommodations in order to protect this relationship even if it is not 
necessarily in their best short-term interest. 
Relational contracts involve not only economic but also emotional exchanges 
(Artz and Brush 2000; Macneil 1974, 1978, 1983). As interorganizational relationships 
become institutionalized over time, personal ties between individual organizational 
members often become increasingly important (Ring and Van de Ven 1994) and can 
pressure individuals to fulfill their obligations (Ellickson 1991; Macaulay 1963). Trust 
can be viewed as a learning process in relational contracting: parties begin by taking 
small risks and are willing to take larger risks in subsequent interactions if these 
cooperative efforts are successful (Lorenz 1999). Transaction costs in relational 
contracting are incurred prior to implementation of the contract when parties initially 
establish their relationship and following its implementation when parties periodically 
renegotiate and adjust the contract (Artz and Brush 2000). While successful relational 
contracting has higher short-term transaction costs, the long-term transaction costs may 
be lower because of reduced bidding, monitoring, and legal costs (Brown et al. 2006).  
Some scholars have argued that trust and the degree of formalization can play 
complementary roles in contracts (Deakin, Lane, & Wilkinson, 1994; Allen et al., 2002).  
A formal agreement between parties may signal a pre-existing cooperative relationship 
because such relationships can facilitate the planning needed to develop a detailed 
contract (Deakin et al. 1994). Likewise, the process of contract development, itself, may 
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actually serve as a mechanism for building trusting relationships (Allen et al. 2002). 
Consistent with the perspective that trust and the degree of formalization in contracts can 
play complementary roles, this paper conceptualizes the extent to which a contract is 
complete and the strength of the relationship between the government and contractor as 
two intersecting continuums.   
<Figure 1 about here> 
 Some contracts have considerable formal specification and involve strong 
relationships between the government and contractor. There are also contracts that lack 
one of these two features. Thus, some contracts have substantial formal specification but 
they involve weak relationships. Other contacts have little formal specificity but they 
involve strong relationships. Contracts in this latter category have been traditionally 
classified as “relational” in the contracting literature. Finally, there are contracts that lack 
both formal specification and strong relationships between the government and the 
contractor. The degree of relationship strength and specification is often in flux, and the 
same contract may not consistently fall in one category over time. Our understanding of 
contracts in this paper is not limited to the formal written agreement between two entities 
in which one entity promises to deliver products or services to the other entity in 
exchange for money. Instead, contracts here refer to the entire relationship that exists 
between these two entities with its formal and informal aspects.   
HYPOTHESES 
In summary, all real life contracts appear to be incomplete. Contracts can vary in 
the extent to which they are complete and in the strength of the relationship between the 
government and contractor. Where a contracting arrangement falls on these two 
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continuums constitutes what this paper refers to as “relationship design” and is likely to 
be associated with contractor performance. However, the direction of these associations is 
unclear. Reflecting this, several rival propositions are developed in this section.   
On the one hand, contractor performance may be expected to improve as the 
relationship between the government and contractor becomes stronger. Since the 
government and contractor in strong relationships are jointly involved in the development 
and implementation of the contracts, the provider is more likely to feel involved, 
appreciated, and empowered in this type of contracting arrangement. This will encourage 
the service provider to act as a steward, taking a leadership role when problems arise. As 
a result, one would expect problems to be resolved faster and with more openness, which 
in turn will positively affect program performance. The trust and cooperation that strong 
relationships foster can also lessen principal concerns that the agent will behave 
opportunistically. Close involvement reduces the likelihood of informational asymmetries 
and incentives for shirking. Moreover, due to their critical role in the implementation, 
service providers are more likely to view performance data as meaningful and accurate. 
In such cases, the contractors will be less likely to view their compliance with 
performance standards and requirements imposed by the government agency as a 
distraction from programmatic activities. As a result, the government will need to spend 
less time and money on direct monitoring and evaluation and will therefore incur fewer 
transaction costs. Under these conditions, we would expect contractor performance to be 
improved if the partnership reinvests these initial transaction cost savings into service 
delivery.    
Hypothesis 1a: Relationship strength is positively associated with contractor 
performance. 
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With this in mind, it is also possible that contractor performance may suffer as the 
relationship between the government and contractor becomes stronger. As DeHoog (1990) 
points out, the close cooperative relationships that can develop in contracts may foster a 
sense of complacency and result in the parties failing to develop adequate systems for 
monitoring service delivery. Informal ties between government agencies and contractors 
may discourage in-depth investigation of performance outputs, and as a result, there may 
be less incentive for contracted providers to deliver high quality services. Hence a 
competing hypothesis can be proposed here: 
Hypothesis 1b: Relationship strength is negatively associated with contractor 
performance. 
 
Similarly, rival hypotheses can be proposed on the impact of contract 
completeness on contractor performance. On the one hand, empirical evidence suggests 
that carefully specified contracts make it easier for the government to hold contractors 
accountable for the services they deliver (Romzek and Johnston 2005). Based on this, one 
would expect contractors to be more motivated to provide better services and to perform 
better as contract specificity increases.   
Hypothesis 2a: The extent to which a contract is complete is positively associated 
with contractor performance. 
 
On the other hand, carefully specifying a complicated contract delivered under 
uncertain conditions may result in the government and contractor diverting staffing, time, 
and other resources from service delivery towards contract specification and negotiation. 
Moreover, as the quality of the contract increases, the cost of monitoring the 
implementation frequently increases as well (Bouckaert and Peters 2002). If contract 
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specificity results in excessive transaction costs, we would expect contractor performance 
to suffer. Thus, our rival hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 2b: The extent to which a contract is complete is negatively 
associated with contractor performance. 
 
METHODS 
 
In this study, we identify several components of government contracts used to 
characterize the strength of the relationship between the government and contractor and 
the extent to which these contracts are complete. Based on these classifications, we 
investigate how relationship design impacts performance in the field of child care. Aside 
from the central variables of interest, pertaining to the design of contracting relationships, 
the framework also includes a set of controls .  
Data. The data for this study come from the Partnership Impact Research Project 
(File ICPSR04298-v1, 2001-2004). It is a three-year study aimed at describing and 
evaluating the character of early education partnerships in the state of Ohio. Two of the 
six data sets comprising the Partnership Impact Research Project have been used in the 
analysis: (1) the Child Care Center Data (DS1), containing data on the child care centers 
mainly provided by center directors and focusing on the population served, services 
provided, funding sources, and other major characteristics of the centers, and (2) the 
Child Care Center Partnership Data (DS2), containing data on child care centers’ 
contracts with local Head Start agencies in Ohio and focusing on various aspects of the 
relationships between the two contracting parties. Both files include pooled time-series 
data with up to three survey records for each Center (or partnership, in the case of DS2).   
The Child Care Center Data is a larger organizational-level dataset containing 
information on nonprofit and for-profit service providers. Some of these providers 
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contract with a local Head Start agency while others do not. Meanwhile, the Child Care 
Center Partnership Data is a smaller partnership-level dataset and includes information 
only on those centers that have partnerships with a local Head Start agency. These data 
sets were merged using Center ID numbers and wave indicators to obtain an unbalanced 
panel data set containing 193 records, each describing a partnership between a private 
center and a local Head Start agency. Thus, centers that are not involved in a contract 
with a local Head Start agency have been dropped from the analysis.  
Dependent Variable. In the public management literature, there is a broad 
consensus that organizational performance is a complex and multi-dimensional concept 
(Boyne et al. 2005; Boschken 1992, 1994; Brewer and Selden 2000; Brewer 2006; 
Cameron 1978, 1981, 1982; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981, 1983; Rojas 2000; Selden and 
Sowa 2004). Hence, multiple measures of organizational performance may provide a 
fuller picture of the delivered results. We use two measures of child care center 
performance, one subjective and one objective, in order to capture the complex and multi-
dimensional nature of organizational performance (Boyne et al. 2005; Boschken 1992, 
1994; Brewer and Selden 2000; Brewer 2006; Cameron 1978, 1981, 1982; Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh 1981, 1983; Rojas 2000; Selden and Sowa 2004). The Partnership Impact 
Research Project dataset includes data generated by government agencies. For our first 
measure of child care center performance, we use an interval-ratio variable reflecting the 
“number of violations documented during state licensing inspection.” The actual values 
of this variable in the data set range between 0 and 49. The variable appears to have a 
Poisson distribution with positive-only values and a large share of cases clustered around 
lower values.   
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Our second measure of performance is based on child care center directors’ 
answers to the following survey question: “How satisfied are you with the overall quality 
of your center?” Respondents were asked to select one of the following five response 
categories: “very satisfied” (5), “somewhat satisfied” (4), “neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied” (3), “not very satisfied” (2), or “not satisfied at all” (1). In the survey, 
directors were first asked to provide detailed background information on their center as 
well as feedback on teacher training and professional development, parental involvement, 
center services, and center administration and organization. The question about directors’ 
satisfaction with the overall quality of their center was strategically placed after all of 
these concerns had been discussed.   
Based on the above mentioned question, we created an ordinal variable and used 
it in the ordered logistic regression analysis. For sensitivity analysis, we created a dummy 
variable coded as 1 for “very satisfied” and 0 for all other responses. Since we were 
concerned that the child care center directors were unlikely to express dissatisfaction with 
their own operations, we grouped “somewhat satisfied” in the “0” category in order to 
reduce the “halo effect.” The resulting variable was used as the dependent variable in the 
dichotomous logistic regression model. Similar to measures used in several recent studies 
(e.g. Chun and Rainey 2005; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; Brewer and Selden 2000; 
Selden and Sowa 2004), this measure of organizational performance is clearly subjective. 
While measures that are considered to be more “objective” are frequently treated as the 
“gold standard” in public management research, they are often not available or do not 
adequately capture the multi-dimensional nature of performance (Andrews et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, scholars agree that it is possible to develop valid, reliable, and 
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sensitive subjective measures of organizational performance (Brewer 2006). An 
advantage of using employee self-reports to measure performance in addition to the data 
on “violations” is that the reports provide a global measure of performance and are able 
to capture both output and outcome-based criteria (Moynihan and Pandey 2005).  
 Independent Variables. The survey items used to create independent variables are 
listed in Appendix 1. To account for relationship design, we created three independent 
variables. The variable complete was created to measure the existence of formally 
recorded documents and procedures guiding contract implementation. This variable was 
computed by finding the sum of the following eight dichotomous survey items:  
1. Currently do you have a written legal agreement or a contract with Head Start? 
2. Do you regularly update the document? 
3. Does this agreement specify the maximum number of children who can receive 
Head Start enhanced services at your center? 
4. In your partnership with Head Start, do you have a written document that 
describes roles and responsibilities of Head Start and of people at your center 
in providing services?  
5. Do you have any documents that describe the partnership's goals and specific 
actions that the partnership plans to take to achieve the goals?  
6. In your partnership, do you have any written documents that state what your 
program needs to do to meet Head Start Program Performance Standards?  
7. Do you have documents describing procedures for communicating with your 
Head Start partner?  
8. Do you have a well-defined process for recruiting and enrolling children into 
your center for Head Start enhanced services? 
 
We had two measure of relationship strength for each contract in the data. Our 
measure of current relationship strength was created by computing the mean of several 
survey items, each measured on a 5-point Likert scale. The variable shared procedures 
was created to reflect the existence of procedures which govern the partnership and are 
understood by both parties but are not necessarily formally recorded. This variable is a 
mean of eight survey items measured on a 5-point Likert scale and listed in Appendix 1. 
The variable goal agreement reflects contractors’ perception of both parties’ agreement 
 16
on contract goals computed from four survey items. The variable communication quality 
measures whether or not child care center directors believe they have good 
communication with Head Start and is computed from three survey items listed in 
Appendix 1. Finally, cooperation in contract implementation is a variable based on five 
survey items describing a variety of cooperative strategies. To assess the reliability of the 
scales for the four new variables, we calculated Cronbach alphas, and the results show 
acceptable alpha scores which range from 0.792 to 0.906. A confirmatory factor analysis 
of these four variables indicated that they could effectively be combined into a single 
measure of current relationship strength.4 Thus, we created a composite current 
relationship strength scale using principal component factor analysis. Factor scores 
produced from the factor analysis are used as a measure for current relationship strength.  
The measures of relationship strength described above characterize the current 
design of the contracting relationship, i.e., one existing at the time of the survey. This 
study also accounts for the elements of relationship strength exhibited in the contract 
development and specification stage. Since some aspects of strong relationships may be 
viewed as “deference” in disguise due to the contractor’s power, information on the 
contractor’s input in the specification process may also help separate the effect of the 
contractor’s power in the relationship. We have created a variable collaborative contract 
development as our second measure of relationship strength using the following question: 
“Was this agreement5 developed by both your program and your partner?” Positive 
answers to this question were coded as 1, and negative answers were coded as 0. This 
measure reflects the collaborative nature of the contractual relationship at the onset of 
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contracting, while the rest of our relationship strength variables characterize the ongoing 
relationship. 6  
Control Variables. Several empirical studies within the public administration 
literature have examined determinants of organizational performance that may serve as 
relevant controls in this study (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Boyne 2003; Moynihan and 
Pandey 2005). Integrating the existing literature on organizational performance, 
Moynihan and Pandey (2005) test the effect of two categories of performance 
determinants: internal management factors and external environmental influences. While 
focusing on the effect of relationship design, we use their framework to justify the 
inclusion of control variables pertaining to various organizational and environmental 
factors. These variables are listed in Figure 2, and the coding procedures are explained in 
Appendix 1.  
Center management and staffing practices are critical organizational 
characteristics that may impact performance. Similar to Moynihan and Ingraham (2003), 
we view management capacity as a broad concept and measure it in a variety of different 
ways in our study. The level of effort made by child care center administrators to monitor 
teaching quality, improve child care programs, and evaluate program performance may 
impact staff commitment and attitudes and the innovativeness of the child care programs. 
Our first measure of management capacity, internal management practices, is based on 
the sum of seven survey items and focuses on various administrative processes, such as 
managers “observing teachers in the classroom to assess their practice” and “meeting 
with teachers to provide feedback regarding their teaching practices in the classroom.”   
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We also consider human resource capacity as another aspect of management 
capacity. Staff qualifications may be positively associated with contractor performance 
because the design and operation of a child care program predominantly depends on the 
quality of its teachers. As a proxy for human resource capacity, we include two measures 
reflecting the proportion of teachers with a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree, as explained 
in Appendix 1.   
As a final aspect of management capacity, we consider the impact of resource 
availability on contractor performance. Many empirical studies have found that 
organizations with more resources are able to achieve better outcomes (Boyne 2003). 
Additional resources may allow a child care center to improve its physical environment 
and instructional practices. Based on this, we include both a child care center’s total 
annual operating budget as well as the budget-student ratio to measure the availability of 
financial resources. We also control for the supply of teachers in each center using the 
student-teacher ratio reported by each center. Availability of teachers may increase the 
amount of individualized attention available for each student and improve teacher 
motivation by decreasing burnout.   
Organizational size is another internal factor commonly thought to be associated 
with organizational performance. Organization size can be hypothesized to have either a 
negative or positive impact on contractor performance. Larger contractors may enjoy 
economies of scale in acquiring educational resources, reducing maintenance costs of 
facilities, containing administrative costs, and creating efficient administrative procedures. 
On the other hand, larger organizations may have more red tape which negatively 
influences innovativeness and the adoption of new ideas (Moynihan and Pandey 2005). 
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Smaller contractors may also have an advantage in fostering a more nurturing and 
intimate environment for young children. In this study, we used the average daily 
enrollment of preschoolers as a proxy measure for organizational size.   
Several studies suggest that organizational ownership may affect performance, 
and a subset of the privatization literature specifically explores the effect of the privatized 
entities’ ownership status on the outcomes (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2008; 
Amirkhanyan 2008). Nonprofit contractors are expected to provide higher quality of care 
to children. In comparison to for-profit care centers, nonprofit centers are more likely to 
have higher mission valences which may motivate their teachers (Rainey and Steinbauer 
1999). Nonprofit child care centers are also required to reinvest any profits back into their 
organizations instead of rewarding shareholders as for-profit child care centers may 
choose to do (Cohen 2001). As a result, nonprofit centers would be less likely to increase 
their profits through cost-cutting strategies that may ultimately undermine quality. In 
addition, whether a child care center is a faith-based organization may matter. Compared 
to their secular counterparts, faith-based organizations may use different service delivery 
methods or they use the same service delivery methods but with a different intensity 
(Graddy and Ye 2006). To reflect these possible relationships, we include a dummy 
variable indicating whether the contracted child care center is a nonprofit organization, as 
well as a separate variable indicating if the center is a faith-based organization.   
In addition, several variables have been included to reflect external organizational 
relationships and other environmental factors. First, external organizational ties and 
relative organizational independence have been hypothesized in the literature to be 
correlated with organizational performance. We created a nominal variable using the 
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following survey item to control for external organizational ties: “Is your center part of a 
larger agency or umbrella organization?” Hypothesizing that a child care center that 
heavily depends on government funds may be pressured to perform better, we also 
created a variable reflecting contractors’ reliance on government funds, including Federal 
Head Start, State Head Start, State Preschool Subsidies, and USDA CACFP (see 
Appendix 1 for coding procedures). In addition, we included a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the center operates in a “small town” or “rural area” (as opposed to an 
“urban” or “suburban” area). Child care centers in urban and suburban areas are likely to 
serve more diverse populations, making service provision more complicated. On the other 
hand, contractors working in rural areas or in small towns may have difficulty hiring high 
quality staff, which may negatively influence performance. Recognizing that the 
characteristics of the client population might affect center outcomes, we control for the 
percent of white preschoolers as well as the percent of subsidized families whose children 
receive care at the center.  
In this study, we also control for relationship length measured by the number of 
years that a child care center has engaged in a partnership with a local Head Start agency. 
Having a longer relationship may foster a greater shared understanding of service 
delivery goals between the government and contractor, ultimately improving contractor 
performance. Longer relationships also give contractors more time to make the service 
delivery adjustments needed to satisfy government expectations or to modify the 
government’s expectations so that the expectations are perceived as more reasonable by 
the contractor. On the other hand, longer relationships may make the government more 
lax in monitoring contractor behavior, and performance may suffer as a result. Since 
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partnerships have been studied over time, we separate the year fixed effects by including 
two dummies indicating the wave of each survey record.   
<Table 1 about here> 
<Table 2 about here> 
Descriptive Statistics and Analysis. The descriptive statistics of the variables and 
the correlations are provided in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.7 In our analysis, we ran four 
regression models. The first two use perceived center performance as the dependent 
variable while the second two use the number of regulatory violations.   
Two perceived center performance measures – ordinal and dichotomous, as 
explained previously – were analyzed using ordered and dichotomous logistic regressions. 
Approximately 45% of the surveyed center directors were “very satisfied” with the 
performance of their child care center. A child care center director’s satisfaction with 
organizational performance was regressed on the complete set of independent variables, 
summarized in Appendix 1. Since the variable reflecting the number of violations found 
in each child care center was found to have a skewed distribution with positive-only 
values, we obtained Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions in order to adjust for 
skewness of the dependent variable and prevent the model from predicting negative 
values. The poisson regression had a Pearson chi-square (5.769) and deviance greater 
than one (5.862), indicating overdispersion which violates the assumption of equality of 
the mean and the variance of the dependent variable imposed by the Poisson model. In 
such cases, Negative Binomial models are recommended. They accommodate the 
overdispersion by including a random term reflecting unexplained between-subject 
differences (Gardner, Mulvey and Shaw 1995). The LR chi-square statistic is satisfactory 
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(38.63, p=0.007). In the findings section, we show the results for both the OLS and 
negative binomial regressions.  
Limitations. There are some limitations associated with the data and research 
design. First, our data set is limited to contracted agencies located in one state delivering 
one type of service which may result in the findings of our study having limited 
generalizability. Cost of living, child care worker salaries, child care policies as well as 
an array of other factors are likely to vary across states, and this variation is not captured 
in our study. Focusing on a service area in which performance is very difficult to measure 
also limits the generalizability of our study. Our findings are likely to be most 
generalizable to other social services where customers are typically unable to judge 
quality such as elderly care services. Users’ relatives in these situations must look for 
performance clues and guess if the service is good. In contrast, our findings may be less 
generalizable to a social service area such as job training where customers are able to 
advocate for themselves. Further replications of this study can help verify the external 
validity of our findings. In addition, the sample size for our analysis is less than two 
hundred which suggests that the statistical power of our models may be limited.   
Finally, there are limitations associated with some of the variables included in our 
study.  Most of the data describing the relationship between contractors and Head Start 
are provided by the contractors, rather than by both parties. Thus, this study explores the 
effect of contractors’ perception of goal congruence, shared procedures, joint 
participation, and other factors. This limits our ability to view the design and performance 
of contracting relationships from multiple perspectives. However, the contractors’ views, 
we believe, are quite informative for this analysis. In particular, one would expect 
 23
contractors to have less incentive than the government to misrepresent the level of 
collaboration in the contracting process.   
FINDINGS 
Regression results presented in Table 3 suggest that current relationship strength 
is positively associated with child care center performance when measured by the 
directors’ satisfaction. In the ordered logit model, as current relationship strength 
increases, so does the center director’s satisfaction with child care services. This 
association is also confirmed in the dichotomous logistic regression model. It suggests 
that having a stronger ongoing relationship between the government agency and the 
center increases the odds that a center director will be very satisfied with its performance. 
On the other hand, the variable complete has a negative significant association with 
perceived service quality in both the ordered and dichotomous logit models. An increase 
in the extent to which a contract is complete is associated with a decrease in the 
satisfaction with a center’s service quality. We found no evidence of a contractor’s 
participation in the contract specification process being associated with the director’s 
satisfaction with their center’s performance. The coefficients for collaborative contract 
development are insignificant in both models. Thus, it is the ongoing relationship strength 
that appears to be associated with performance rather than the initial collaborative work 
on contract specification.  
<Table 3 about here> 
Besides the coefficient estimates, we computed the marginal change in the 
predicted probability of being satisfied with child care services in response to a one 
standard deviation change in each significant explanatory variable around its mean. The 
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marginal change reflects the marginal effects of a one unit difference in the independent 
variables. These can be used to compare the effects of different variables included in the 
model.8 In Table 4, a one standard deviation increase in the variable current relationship 
strength increases the predicted probability of being very satisfied by 12.6 percent, while 
a one standard deviation change in the variable complete decreases the predicted 
probability of being very satisfied by 13.1 percent. While the variable complete appears 
to have a larger impact, the difference between these two explanatory variables is only 
0.5 percentage points. The marginal changes in probabilities in the ordered logit model 
concur with the probability changes predicted in the dichotomous logit model. A one 
standard deviation change in the variable complete decreases the probability of being 
“very satisfied” by 14.7 percent while increasing the probability of all the other responses. 
Similarly, as current relationship strength increases by one standard deviation, the 
probability of being “very satisfied” increases by 19 percent, but the probability of all the 
other responses decreases.  
<Table 4 about here> 
Several control variables also have significant associations with a child care 
center director’s satisfaction with performance. In both models, the proportion of teachers 
with a Bachelor’s degree is positively associated with the director’s perception of 
organizational performance. In addition, the ordered logistic regression model indicates 
that being part of a larger organization is positively associated with the director’s 
satisfaction with performance. Meanwhile, there is a negative association between our 
dependent variable and the length of the contracting relationship. In the dichotomous 
logit, a higher student-to-teacher ratio has a negative association with the center director’s 
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satisfaction. Also, a higher percentage of white students is associated with better 
performance in this model.   
As a sensitivity analysis, we ran two additional models (not shown). First, we 
used an OLS model to regress our original (ordinal) dependent variable measuring 
directors’ satisfaction on all independent variables. Second, we recoded our ordinal 
dependent variable into a dichotomous variable using a more traditional approach, i.e., 
coding “very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied” as 1, and the rest of the response 
categories as 0. This variable was used to run a dichotomous logit. Both models produced 
results similar to those shown in Table 3.   
Next, we ran two models using the number of regulatory violations detected 
during the state licensing inspection at each center as a dependent variable. Contrary to 
the results from the perceived performance models, none of the key independent variables 
were significant in either of these models as shown in Table 5. However, several control 
variables have significant associations with contractor performance. Similar to the 
perceived performance model, the estimated parameters for the proportion of teachers 
with BA degrees and student-teacher ratio have the expected signs indicating better 
teacher quality and smaller numbers of students per teacher are associated with a reduced 
number of violations. Two other variables capturing the effects of available 
organizational resources are also significant, but the directions of the associations are 
mixed. While the budget-student ratio shows a positive association with the number of 
violations which is contrary to expectations, annual budget has a negative association 
with the number of violations as hypothesized. Finally, having external ties to a larger 
umbrella organization is negatively associated with the number of violations.  
 26
<Table 5 about here> 
DISCUSSION 
This paper makes an empirical contribution to the contracting literature by 
examining the association between the design of contracting relationships and contractor 
performance. Consistent with assertions by Deakin et al. (1994) and Allen et al. (2002) 
that trust and the degree of formalization can play complementary roles in contracts, this 
paper conceptualizes contracting relationships as varying both in the extent to which they 
involve formal contract specification and the extent to which they rely on cooperation and 
trust. In situations where the relationship between the government and contractor is 
strong, contractors actively participate in contract design and implementation. These 
contracting relationships also involve openness and depend on collaboration to resolve 
day-to-day operational problems. Meanwhile, completeness involves generating and 
enforcing formally documented conditions, standards, and performance measures.   
This study finds partial support for Hypothesis 1a: relationship strength is 
positively associated with perceived contractor performance but not with the number of 
regulatory violations. Contractors that had stronger ongoing relationships with the 
government (i.e., those existing during contract implementation, rather than at the 
contract specification stage) were more satisfied with the performance of their center. 
Child care centers reporting shared understandings of procedures, agreement on contract 
goals, high communication quality, and cooperation in contract implementation were 
more likely to be satisfied with the overall quality of their facility. These findings suggest 
that having participatory contract implementation may allow contractors to: (1) have a 
voice in developing meaningful contract monitoring procedures, (2) provide feedback and 
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share their understanding of contract goals and government agencies’ expectations, and 
(3) communicate openly and frequently while seeking help in the case of operational 
problems. These mechanisms may result in contractors being more satisfied with their 
child care center’s effectiveness.  
Relationship strength seems to matter during contract implementation but not in 
contract specification. While current relationship strength is positively associated with 
perceived contractor performance, collaborative contract development is not significantly 
associated with either perceived performance or the number of regulatory violations. 
Thus, the ongoing relationship dynamics between the contractor and government agency 
appear to have a greater impact on contractors’ assessment of their performance than the 
relationship dynamics that exist during the short period of contract specification.  
In addition, we find partial support for Hypothesis 2b: the extent to which a 
contract is complete is negatively associated with perceived contractor performance but 
there is no association between contract specificity and the number of regulatory 
violations. Contractors who reported being required to comply with the formally 
documented standards and procedures were less satisfied with their center’s performance. 
Having a contract with a high degree of formalization may force vendors to spend scarce 
organizational resources on complying with procedural and reporting requirements and 
give them less time to focus on core programmatic activities. As a result, contractors may 
believe that their performance has suffered. Having a contract with a high degree of 
formalization also may increase the likelihood that the vendor will perceive at least some 
of its procedural and reporting requirements as unclear, unreasonable, or overly strict. 
This is another reason why lower satisfaction may be associated with such contracts.9  
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The opposite signs of our two key independent variables in the models where 
perceived performance is the dependent variable are notable. While having an informal, 
shared understanding of rules and procedures has a positive association with perceived 
performance, having documents that formally describe those rules has the opposite 
association. While being able to “pick up the phone and call” the Head Start agency is 
associated with enhanced performance, having formal documents that describe the 
procedures for communicating with the agency is not. Having a close relationship with 
the government may empower the contractor and means that the vendors can “initiate” 
interactions, freely discussing their operational issues and seeking feedback. On the other 
hand, formally specifying the procedures for communication presumes that the informal 
ties are not there, and the formal ones may be viewed as constraints. Thus, the extent that 
informal, trust-based strategies are used in place of more formalized ones in contracting 
relationships appears to be crucial in determining organizational performance, at least as 
it is perceived by the contractor. 
The arguments presented above suggest that that having a stronger relationship or 
lower levels of contract specification should also be negatively associated with the 
number of violations identified by the government inspectors. This study, however, fails 
to find any evidence of such effect: relationship design variables are insignificant when 
regulatory violations as used to measure contractor performance. What our findings may 
suggest is that when contractors feel comfortable and satisfied with their relationships 
with the government agency, they will also be likely to feel comfortable and satisfied 
with their performance. Similarly, being required to comply with the formally 
documented standards and procedures may contribute to the vendors’ frustration due to 
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the need to spend organizational resources on complying with these formal requirements. 
On the other hand, the way relationships are structured has no impact on the more 
objective measures of contractor performance – their likelihood of violating a rule or a 
procedure. Thus, while the literature on relational contracting has only now begun 
exploring the effect of collaborative strategies on performance, our study suggests that 
the question must be reframed to differentiate the effects of relationships on the distinct 
aspects of organizational performance.    
In addition to two of our explanatory variables being significantly associated with 
one measure of contractor performance, we find significant associations between several 
control variables and at least one of our dependent variables. Here we highlight the most 
interesting associations. Recent performance management studies have frequently 
stressed that management matters for organizational performance (Forbes and Lynn 2005; 
Goerdel 2006; Moynihan and Pandey 2005). We find partial support for an association 
between managerial capacity and contractor performance. The following measures of 
managerial capacity demonstrate a significant association with contractor performance in 
the expected direction in at least one of our models: proportion of teachers with BA 
degrees, student-teacher ratio, and annual budget. In addition, the budget-student ratio is 
significantly associated with contractor performance but in the opposite direction than 
hypothesized.    
Our analysis also provides partial support for an association between relationship 
length and center performance. This finding is particularly significant since our analysis 
focuses on human service agencies where the common predicament is “once a contractor, 
always a contractor.” First, long-term relationships may be more prevalent in small and 
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non-competitive markets. In such cases, the absence of competitive markets could 
discourage the vendors from excelling (especially if the contracts were politically 
motivated), and the government agencies may be forced to partner with organizations 
despite performance problems. Second, as the regulatory requirements in the field of 
health and human services are becoming more complex, the child care centers that were 
given contracts many years ago may have a hard time satisfying the current expectations 
of the government inspectors. Finally consistent with arguments made by DeHoog (1990), 
longer contracts may result in monitoring arrangements where relationships become more 
important than performance, and the increasing latitude in government oversight 
translates into lower performance. Thus, contractors’ motivation and commitment to 
excel in child care would tend to diminish as the relationship continues.  
CONCLUSION 
For years, public management scholars have expressed concern over government 
agencies’ contract monitoring capacity. In order to ensure public managers are investing 
their time and resources as effectively as possible, it is important to understand what 
monitoring mechanisms are going to make a difference for the “outcomes” government 
agencies care about, rather than using those that merely “satisfy” the vendors. Ultimately, 
whether or not these findings mean that public managers should invest more or less of 
their time focusing on relationship development and contract specification, depends on 
the merits of each performance measure used in this study.   
Objective measures are often a key source of performance data informing 
government agencies’ decisions. Our study’s violation measure mostly focuses on the 
health and safety of child care settings. This measure may be perceived as overly formal 
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and rigid and may be applied in ways that do not take into consideration the service 
delivery context and the holistic impact of child care services. Subjective measures, on 
the other hand, may be more comprehensive and informed by an in-depth knowledge of 
conditions in the field and client outcomes. However, they may also reflect the 
contractors’ understanding of organizational and programmatic goals that may or may not 
coincide with those of the government agencies. Thus, each measure may be argued to 
have its strengths and weaknesses. This study suggests that objective measures of 
contractor performance collected by government agencies may not always correlate with 
the contractors’ own perception of organizational performance. Based on this, 
governments should be encouraged to collect performance information from a variety of 
sources in order to capture the complex, multi-dimensional nature of performance. 
Possible sources of performance measurement data include:  government contract 
managers, contractors, third-party inspectors, and service recipients. 
This study finds that efforts to make contracts more complete and to strengthen 
relationships appear to matter for subjective assessments of contractor performance but 
not for more objective measures of performance. If future research confirms these 
findings, public management scholars should continue to explore alternative managerial 
strategies and identify ones that do affect objective measures. Likewise, public managers 
should be cautioned against investing significant resources in carefully detailing as many 
contractual contingencies as possible and cultivating strong relationships with contractors 
if these investments are not going to improve the actual quality of contracted services. 
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missing 32 cases (5 violations) and ran our regressions with this new dependent variable.  The effects of 
independent variables remained unchanged. The proportion of missing cases among control variables was 
well below 5%, and we imputed average or mode values.  
7 We conducted a collinearity diagnosis using VIF and condition index. All the VIF values (1.123~4.122) 
are much lower than the typical cut point, 10 (Allison, 1999).  We chose 30 for the critical value of 
condition index following Gujarati (1995) and 0.5 for the proportion of variation index threshold as 
suggested by Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).  Only one of the condition index scores (56.211) exceeds 30.  
At the highest condition index level (i.e. 56.211), none of the proportion of variation scores is greater than 
0.5, except for reliance on government funds of which the variation proportion is 0.602.  When only one 
high variation is associated with the highest condition index, the potential collinearity does not exhibit 
degradation (Besley et al. 1980). Therefore, we conclude that the estimation is not biased by collinearity.  
8 The marginal change in odds was calculated by using the prchange command in STATA. 
9 We are unable to rule out the possibility of reverse causality in our model. Given this, another possible 
interpretation of our results is that poor contractor performance results in the adoption of more formalized 
contracts. Based on the operationalization of our variables, it is also possible to interpret our results as 
indicating that contractor staff who believe their organizations are performing well are less likely to 
perceive formalization in their relationships with the government.   
 
